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1. Introduction 
Investment banks act as gatekeepers to the capital markets. Understanding how enterprises and 
banks interact is thus a crucial component in understanding how the wider economy operates. When 
a firm wishes to sell securities, it engages an investment bank to provide distribution services which 
include underwriting, promotion, and certification. Thus, borrowing from the industrial organization 
literature, firms and banks operate in a vertical market, with firms upstream and banks downstream.1  
The finance literature documents that companies issuing securities tend to hire the same 
investment banks over and over again, both in the bond market (Yasuda (2005)) and in the equity 
market (Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006)). Rather than employing long-term contracts or 
vertical integration, which are commonly observed in other industries, the vertical structure of 
investment banking is thus characterized by relationships.2 These relationships are often viewed as a 
barrier to entry into investment banking.  
We show that relationships endure in large part due to a desire to avoid sharing bankers with 
one’s product-market competitors and present evidence that this affects pricing, and hence, 
competition, among banks. Consider Figure 1, which establishes a new stylized fact, namely that 
banks rarely serve more than one large firm in an industry. Using underwriting data from Thomson 
Financial going back to 1975, Figure 1a shows that the fraction of U.S. underwriters with multiple 
equity clients among the three, five, or ten largest firms in a four-digit SIC industry (ranked by 
annual Compustat net sales) rarely exceeds 5-10%. In other words, over the past three decades, few 
banks had more than one client among the largest firms in an industry. Debt underwriting 
relationships, shown in Figure 1b, appear similarly exclusive (though the level of exclusivity is 
somewhat lower than in the equity market).  
                                                          
1 Tirole (1987) and Rey and Tirole (2007) provide introductions to the theory of vertical markets.  
2 For work on how contracting affects competition, see Gilbert and Hastings (2005), Asker (2004), Ho (2007), and 
Hortacsu and Syverson (2007). 
  
2
Anecdotal evidence confirms that banks often refrain from working for competing firms. Hahn 
(2003) reports a CEO telling a banker during a pitch, “If you talk to my competitors, you are no 
longer welcome here.” The banker abandoned the pitch because he had a strong relationship with a 
competitor, commenting, “Effectively, you have to pick your horse.”  
What accounts for the observed patterns of vertical relationships shown in Figure 1? The null 
hypothesis is that they reflect random matching between banks and firms; with sufficiently many 
banks and industries, banks might randomly serve few competing clients. We test, and reject, the 
null of such random matching in every piece of econometric analysis we conduct, at any 
significance level. Hence, we investigate the alternative that the patterns may be a response to more 
fundamental economic incentives. We consider three such possibilities. 
First, a bank that works for two clients in the same industry uses the same resources to serve 
both clients’ needs, as investment banking teams typically specialize by industry. If resources are 
scarce, or time is of the essence, the bank may prioritize one client to the detriment of the other 
client. While concerns about such capacity constraints may explain why two firms in the same 
industry avoid sharing investment bankers, the reasons for doing so would be unrelated to actual 
product-market contact between the firms. For example, prior to energy-market deregulation in the 
U.S., two utilities in separate regional markets would be just as concerned about capacity 
constraints as two firms in direct competition, such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi.3 
Second, working for two clients in the same industry may give rise to conflicts of interest. A 
prominent example is the bank’s conflicted role in situations where one of its clients launches a 
takeover bid for the other client. Ivashina et al. (2005), for example, show that the likelihood of an 
unsolicited takeover bid increases with the number of firms in a four-digit SIC industry a bank lends 
to. If managers dislike becoming takeover targets, perhaps because they fear a loss of private 
                                                          
3 Our empirical investigation focuses on horizontal competitors. It is possible that a similar aversion to sharing 
underwriters extends to firms that are vertically related. 
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benefits of control, they have an incentive to avoid sharing investment bankers. Again, this 
argument does not require any product-market contact.  
Third, firms may be concerned that privileged information which the bank obtains in the course 
of due diligence or other client contact is passed on to a competitor, whether explicitly, implicitly, 
or accidentally.4 To return to the previous example, Coca-Cola has every incentive to prevent Pepsi 
from learning about Coke’s production plans, product development, or distribution strategy. The 
two regional utilities, on the other hand, would be less concerned about information leakage, at least 
prior to deregulation. Thus, in contrast to the cases of capacity constraints and conflicts of interest, 
product-market contact is a necessary condition for information leakage concerns.  
Our empirical findings suggest that product-market competition is an important determinant of 
the apparent exclusivity in issuer-bank relationships. Along with other evidence, this leads us to 
suggest that firms’ reluctance to share underwriters is primarily due to concerns about information 
leakage concerns. Such concerns have been modeled in the banking literature (see Boot (2000) for a 
review). Raising capital from investors requires disclosure, to overcome adverse selection. 
Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) model the choice between revealing confidential information to a 
bank and public disclosure to the capital markets. Public disclosure suffers from a “two-audiences” 
signaling problem: It lowers the cost of capital but could benefit product-market competitors. A 
necessary condition for dealing with the bank then is that the bank not allow any sensitive 
information to leak to rivals. If the bank cannot precommit to keeping information confidential, or is 
unable to prevent accidental information leakage, competing issuing firms may seek to contain 
information leakage by avoiding sharing banks with rivals.5  
Anecdotal evidence supports this view. In a submission to a Competition Commission inquiry 
                                                          
4 We view information leakage as distinct from conflicts of interest. Information could leak accidentally or in ways that 
cannot be coordinated by the bank. 
5 For related theory models, see Anand and Galetovic (2000, 2006), Baccara (2005), Baccara and Razin (2004), and 
Zabojnik (2002). An interesting empirical study of similar issues in the pharmaceutical industry is Azoulay (2004). 
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into equity underwriting in the UK (Competition Commission (1999)), the London Investment 
Banking Association acknowledged that “Firms were understandably reluctant to make sensitive 
information more widely known than necessary” and thus had an incentive to restrict their dealing 
to a very limited number of investment banks. In the same inquiry, the submissions of Barclays 
Global Investors and Prudential Portfolio Managers, on the investor side, and the Ladbroke Group 
and CISCO, on the client side, raised the issue of information leakage in the context of underwriting 
relationships. 
In 1987, Citicorp, a frequent debt issuer, asked First Boston, its investment bank, to resign from 
the underwriting syndicate of one of Citicorp’s competitors, Manufacturers Hanover. Eccles and 
Crane (1988, p. 59) recount that “First Boston denied a conflict of interest, but Citicorp apparently 
felt it was not worth the risk of having information […] in the hands of its competitor.” Similarly, 
several disputes about information leakage have arisen in the M&A advisory context. Stuart (2006) 
reports market rumors that Goldman Sachs resigned from an advisory role after being accused of 
leaking confidential information from a previous engagement for the target to the bidder. Hahn 
(2003) reports similar allegations arising in a lawsuit against UBS filed by a former client. 
Consistent with the notion that exclusivity is more prevalent in industries where the demand for 
secrecy may be higher, the data reveal greater exclusivity in relatively more concentrated industries, 
in industries that are relatively more dependent on intangibles, and in industries characterized by 
“soft” information (see Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Berger et al. (2005))). As Table 1 shows, 
these patterns hold both in the equity and in the debt markets.  
Prompted by these preliminary findings, our empirical strategy proceeds as follows. Using a 
large set of equity and debt deals completed by large (and therefore strategically relevant) U.S. 
firms in 1975-2003, we examine firms’ choices on margins that allow us to control for the costs and 
benefits of sharing an investment bank. The costs may arise from either capacity constraints, 
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conflicts of interest, or the risk of information leakage. The benefits take the form of a bank’s 
accumulated industry expertise: A bank serving other large firms likely has more experience of the 
issuer’s industry, and thus greater credibility with investors, than a bank that has no other clients in 
the industry. Identification requires that we vary the costs while holding the benefits constant.  
To unravel these effects, we begin by using plausibly exogenous variation from mergers among 
banks (Section 2). This enables us to hold industry expertise constant while varying the risk of 
sharing an underwriter. We find that both equity and debt issuers are more likely to switch away 
from their relationship bank if the merger increases the risk of sharing an underwriter than if it does 
not change that risk or if the bank has not been involved in a merger. The effect is to increase a 
client’s switching probability by around thirty percentage points from the unconditional mean.  
The results from the bank-merger test indicate that far from being random, the patterns in Figure 
1 are the result of deliberate actions by firms to avoid sharing investment banks with other firms in 
their industry. In Section 3, we use industry deregulations as a source of exogenous variation in the 
extent of product-market contact among firms within industries. If capacity constraints or conflicts 
of interest account for the reluctance to share underwriters, firms without product-market rivals 
should be just as averse to their investment bankers serving other large firms in their industry as 
firms with product-market rivals, and deregulation should make no difference to their underwriter 
choices. If, on the other hand, choices reflect concerns about information leakage, we expect firms 
without product-market rivals to be indifferent to sharing underwriters prior to deregulation but to 
exhibit increased reluctance as their industry is deregulated. We find that reluctance to share 
underwriters is present only when firms have direct product-market rivals. Specifically, as an 
industry deregulates and competition increases, issuers start avoiding banks with ties to their rivals.  
The evidence from the deregulation test suggests that the patterns in Figure 1 are most 
consistent with concerns about information leakage. To get a sense of the magnitude of this effect, 
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Section 4 exploits firms’ responses to a rival switching relationship banks. Our identifying 
assumption is that when a rival client ends its banking relationship for exogenous reasons, the bank 
continues to benefit from superior knowledge of the rival’s operations for a while but no longer 
poses a risk that information might be leaked to the rival. Such a bank should thus be more 
attractive to other companies in the industry. We find that issuers avoid banks with ties to their 
product market rivals while showing a preference for banks that have recently lost clients in their 
industry. An equity issuer, for instance, is around 55% less likely to choose a bank that presents a 
risk of information leakage than one that does not.  
These results suggest that leaving an existing bank carries the potential cost that the ex-
relationship bank’s incentive to contain information spillovers is diminished. If so, banks gain a 
measure of hold-up power over their clients, which could help explain why underwriting 
relationships tend to endure. This leads to the prediction that banks, appreciating that firms’ 
reluctance to share underwriters reduces the pool of competing banks, will charge higher fees. In 
Section 5, we again exploit deregulations to show that banks increase their fees as product-market 
contact among firms in an industry – and so concerns about sharing banks – increases. This suggests 
that the vertical structure of the investment banking market has an impact on the fees banks charge.  
Firms’ aversion to sharing underwriters appears important in understanding the dynamics of 
vertical relationships in investment banking. In Section 6, we suggest that entry by commercial 
banks appears to have played a role in relaxing the constraint on issuers’ underwriter choices since 
1987 when the Federal Reserve began deregulating Glass-Steagall Act restrictions on commercial 
banks’ underwriting activities. Entry has enabled large firms to establish relationships with multiple 
banks, while banks continue to serve at most one large client per industry. These trends are 
consistent with falling underwriting fees documented in the finance literature (see Gande et al. 
(1997), Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999), or Song (2004)). 
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2. Evidence from Bank Merger Activity 
Is the apparently low incidence of large firms sharing underwriters, shown in Figure 1, random 
or deliberate? In this section, we show how firms react to plausibly exogenous changes in the risk of 
sharing an underwriter with another firm in the industry. The consolidation of investment banking 
over the sample period provides the necessary exogenous shock.  
2.1 Identification  
Consider two banks, each serving one client firm in an industry. At some point the banks merge 
and the clients find themselves potentially sharing an underwriter. Under the null that matches are 
random, the firms don’t care, so the merger will have no effect. However, if the prospect of sharing 
an underwriter generates some significant disutility, the merger will lead to one of the client firms 
switching banks (though we cannot predict which).  
We implement this as a difference-in-differences test. First, we compare the switching behavior 
of firms whose relationship bank has, since their last securities issue, merged with a bank serving 
other large clients in the industry (the treatment group) to the switching behavior of firms whose 
relationship bank has merged with a bank lacking such relationships (control group 1). If sharing an 
underwriter generates significant disutility, we expect greater switching in the treatment group. 
Second, we compare both groups to firms whose relationship bank has not undergone a recent 
merger (control group 2). This allows evaluation of the extent to which mergers induce switching 
for reasons unrelated to concerns about sharing underwriters.  
Difference-in-differences tests are commonly used to remove biases due to omitted variables or 
endogeneity concerns (Ashenfelter and Card (1985)). In our setting, the underwriter’s industry 
expertise, skill in executing the transaction, or some other unobserved quality variable may be 
positively correlated with the presence of a rival firm among its clients. This would negatively bias 
estimates that do not exploit sources of variation that are independent of industry expertise or 
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similar unobservable factors. The test structure proposed avoids such biases because the industry 
expertise of the population of banks, other than the merging banks themselves, is unaffected by the 
merger and, thus, is held constant. Likewise, it allows us to eliminate the effect of not controlling 
adequately for a bank’s skill in executing the transaction or some other quality variable. If these 
were driving a firm’s lead manager choice, we should find no difference, following a bank merger, 
in the switching behavior of firms in those industries where the banks have competing clients (the 
treatment group) and those where they do not (control group 1).6  
2.2 Are Bank Mergers Plausibly Exogenous? 
There were 202 mergers involving sample banks over the 1970-2003 period, with some banks 
being serial acquirers. Figure 2 shows three distinct merger waves, with the last one, beginning in 
1994 and ending in 2001, the most active. Our identification strategy requires a bank not just to 
merge, but to merge with a bank that has clients in the same industry. As it turns out, this is rarely 
the case. Among the 202 mergers, only 12 and 19 involve overlaps in the two banks’ large equity 
and debt clients, respectively. Generally, when a merger involves overlap, the extent of overlap is 
small. On average, only 6.7% (12%) of the combined number of industries in which the merging 
banks served large equity (debt) clients overlap. Conditional on overlap, the average merger 
involves 3.9 industries in which both banks have large equity clients (47 industries in total) and 6.3 
industries in which both banks have large debt clients (119 industries in total).  
Our experiment requires that banks merge for reasons that are unrelated both to the existence of 
overlap among their large clients and to those clients’ anticipated switching decisions. Scanning 
news sources available through Factiva for the merger reasons we find no mention of client overlap 
considerations. Instead, banks appear to motivate their mergers in strategic and synergistic terms.  
                                                          
6 A merger may change a bank’s underwriting capability. Control group 1 allows us the control for this, since any 
change in such capability should have an equivalent effect on both the treatment group and control group 1. That is, the 
difference between the effects on these two groups nets out any change in the bank’s underwriting capability. 
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As Figure 2 shows, many mergers involve acquisitions of investment banks by commercial 
banks, such as the 1999 acquisition of investment banking boutique Hambrecht & Quist by Chase 
Manhattan. Due to Glass-Steagall constraints, commercial banks traditionally had few large 
investment banking clients on the debt side and even fewer (or none) on the equity side, which 
contributes to the low degree of industry overlap we find in our data. Acquisitions of (mostly niche-
oriented) investment banks were seen as a way to expand market share as Glass-Steagall constraints 
were relaxed throughout the 1990s (see, for instance, Weidner (1999)).  
In several other cases, investment banks with a primarily institutional focus acquired investment 
banks with extensive retail franchises, reputedly in an attempt to expand their distribution 
capabilities. Examples include the 1997 acquisition of Salomon Brothers by Travelers Group,7 
owner of retail brokerage firm Smith Barney; Morgan Stanley’s 1997 acquisition of retail brokerage 
firm Dean Witter; and UBS’s 2000 acquisition of PaineWebber.8 
Occasionally, investment banks were acquired after being weakened by idiosyncratic shocks. 
For example, Kidder Peabody was acquired by PaineWebber in 1994 after it emerged that Kidder’s 
head of government trading had created phantom trades to increase his bonus (see Siconolfi (1994)), 
while BT Alex. Brown was acquired by Deutsche Bank in 1999 after reportedly losing $850 million 
in the Long-Term Capital Management crisis in 1998 (see Leander (1999)).  
A rare example of a “voluntary” merger between two banks with similar strengths and thus 
material client overlap is the acquisition of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette by CS First Boston, which 
overlapped in 23 industries for debt clients and 11 industries for equity clients. Why did they 
nonetheless merge? According to Sikora (2000), “DLJ brings First Boston a market-leadership 
position in high-yield bond [trading], a merchant banking portfolio, a middle market M&A practice, 
                                                          
7 Reportedly, CEO “[Sandy] Weill […] emphasized that the primary reason for the Salomon [Brothers] acquisition is to 
expand Smith Barney’s global reach.” See Investment Dealers Digest, Nov. 10, 1997.  
8 Sikora (2000) notes that “PaineWebber largely was coveted by Swiss-based UBS for its retail securities network and 
its lucrative business of providing investment services for high net worth people.” 
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and an Internet-based securities trading arm while also gaining the chance to expand in Europe.”  
While we have found no anecdotal support for the existence of unobservables that correlate both 
with banks’ merger reasons and their clients’ anticipated switching decisions, our empirical 
specifications include bank-specific effects in an effort to mitigate potential omitted variable biases.  
Another potential concern is reverse causality. It is possible that a bank acquires another bank 
for defensive reasons, because it anticipates the loss of a key client.9 If so, we would erroneously 
attribute increased switching in overlapping industries to companies’ reluctance to share 
underwriters rather than the bank’s desire to make up for a client loss it knew was going to happen 
anyway. If such reverse causality were a feature of the data, it would imply that acquirers lose more 
clients than targets. Controlling for whether a company’s previous underwriter was the target or 
acquirer in the bank merger, we find no support for this implication.  
Finally, instead of switching, firms could choose not to raise external finance when their usual 
underwriter begins to serve a rival client following a bank merger. This selection effect would lead 
to downward bias in the estimation of the coefficient of interest. 
2.3 Data 
To implement the difference-in-differences test, we estimate the probability that an issuer 
switches lead managers in consecutive equity or debt deals. Following the literature, a switch is 
defined as an equity (debt) issuer hiring as lead manager any bank other than the lead manager of its 
most recent equity (debt) deal (or, if that bank has since been acquired, its successor).10,11 
Throughout the paper, we focus on underwritten transactions by non-financial and non-
governmental U.S. issuers completed between 1975 and 2003 (though we include 1970-1974 data to 
construct certain lagged variables). As Table 2 shows, there were 19,331 equity and 30,797 debt 
                                                          
9 We thank a referee for alerting us to this possibility. 
10 In the case of multiple lead managers, we code as a switch any failure to retain every lead manager from the previous 
deal. This is the most logical way to code the data, but our results are not sensitive to this coding choice. 
11 Many banks specialize either in equity or debt underwriting, so we follow the literature in modeling equity and debt 
underwriting choices separately. See, for instance, Yasuda (2005) or Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006). 
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offerings by U.S. non-financial issuers between 1975 and 2003, according to Thomson Financial.  
For estimation purposes, we require that each deal was lead-managed by one of the 50 largest 
underwriters ranked by market share in the year of the offering and discard deals underwritten by 
smaller banks. The 50 largest banks account for at least 85% of equity and 95% of debt capital 
raised in any given year. Furthermore, we focus on the ten largest firms (by Compustat net sales) in 
each four-digit SIC industry; only large firms have sufficient issuing volumes for capacity 
constraints to be a significant concern and large enough market shares to expect interactions in the 
product market to have a strategic element.12,13,14 To avoid biased inferences if issuers pre-select 
their lead managers for a program of debt deals spaced some months apart, we also exclude so 
called debt “shelf registrations.”15 This leaves 12,016 deals by 3,353 companies in 418 four-digit 
SIC industries raising $1.3 trillion in constant 1996 dollars. These deals account for 24% of the 
deals completed and 27.9% of the amount raised by U.S. non-financial companies in underwritten 
offerings over the period 1975-2003. As Table 2 shows, nonconvertible bond and common stock 
offerings account for the majority of deals and proceeds.  
For the purpose of implementing the difference-in-differences test, we further exclude first-time 
deals, which cannot involve a switch (though we include 1970-1974 data when identifying first-
time deals). This leaves 3,198 equity deals and 4,341 debt deals over the 1975-2003 sample period.  
2.4 Bivariate Results  
On average, large firms switch lead managers in 52.4% of the equity deals and 62.0% of the 
                                                          
12 This is based on a firm’s primary SIC code. To the extent that firms operate in multiple industries, this is a potential 
source of measurement error which would tend to bias our estimates towards zero. We have repeated each of our tests in 
a restricted sample of single-segment firms. This reduces the available sample by more than 90%. Where tests can still 
be estimated, we find results that are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in the paper.  
13 The product-market share of the tenth largest Compustat firm in the average industry between 1975 and 2003 is 1.5%, 
with a range from nearly zero to 6.1%. This puts an upper bound on the market shares of excluded firms. 
14 If, instead, it is the small players that avoid sharing underwriters, our approach biases us against finding that 
reluctance to share underwriters has an impact on lead manager choice. 
15 See Foster (1989); Denis (1991) documents that equity issuers virtually never make use of shelf registrations. 
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debt deals.16 Of the 3,198 equity deals, 630 follow a merger involving the bank lead-managing the 
issuer’s previous deal. In 49 of these, the previous lead manager merged with a bank that had a 
relationship with another top 10 firm (defined as having lead-managed at least one equity issue for 
another firm ranked in the top 10 in the prior five years); focusing on firms ranked in the top 3, 
there are 18 cases. These events are clearly associated with increased switching: 17 of the 18 issuers 
(94.4%) and 38 of the 49 issuers (77.6%) switch in response to their relationship bank merging with 
the relationship bank of a top 3 or top 10 firm, respectively. For comparison, mergers with banks 
lacking relationships in the industry (control group 1) are followed by a 63.3% switching rate while 
issuers whose relationship bank has not undergone a recent merger (control group 2) switch 49.5% 
of the time. Statistically, the switching rates of the two control groups are significantly lower than 
those of the treatment groups (at the 2% level or better), and they are not significantly different 
from each other. This provides evidence against the null of random matching: Issuers are no more 
or less likely to switch underwriters if their relationship bank has undergone a merger, unless the 
merger resulted in sharing an underwriter with another large firm in the industry.  
The corresponding results for debt issuers are statistically weaker. Of the 4,341 debt deals, 296 
follow a merger. In the 23 (14) cases involving a target bank with relationships among the ten 
(three) largest firms in the issuer’s industry, switching occurs 78.3% (85.7%) of the time. The 
switching rate for the two control groups is 61.8% if the merger involved no overlap and 63.3% in 
the absence of a merger. The switching rate in the 14 treatment cases is marginally significantly 
higher than in the two control groups (p=0.089 and p=0.066, respectively).  
2.5 Multivariate Results  
The bivariate results provide preliminary support for the hypothesis that issuers derive disutility 
from sharing an underwriter. However, they make no attempt to control for other determinants of 
                                                          
16 For comparison, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005) report a 35.9% switching rate between a company’s IPO and its first 
seasoned equity offering. Thus, firms appear to switch lead managers more frequently as they mature.  
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the switching decision. Prior literature suggests that firms have a tendency to stick with their 
previous underwriter (Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006)), to prefer prestigious banks 
(Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001)), and to switch the more time has elapsed since their last deal 
(Fernando, Gatev, and Spindt (2005)). We thus control for the strength of the firm’s relationship 
with its previous underwriter, four proxies for the previous underwriter’s reputation which we 
borrow from prior work, the size of the firm (using log real sales), and the log time since the firm’s 
previous deal. Table 3 summarizes the construction of each control variable and lists relevant 
sources. In addition, we control for lead manager-specific random effects17 and year fixed effects. 
The latter control for the possibility that mergers involving banks with competing clients might 
cluster in certain years which might also happen to be years with high frequencies of switching. 
Table 4 reports the results of probit models of switching.18 The control variables confirm prior 
evidence. Issuers are less likely to switch the stronger their relationship with the bank, the larger the 
bank’s debt market share, if its bank is highly regarded by its peers (as measured by eigenvector 
centrality, a standard measure of social networking), and if the bank’s clients tend to be more loyal. 
Switching propensity also increases with firm size and time since the previous deal. We also include 
a dummy variable indicating if the issuer’s pre-merger lead manager was the target in the merger. If 
the target bank bears the brunt of post-merger layoffs and firms switch in response to the resulting 
organizational upheaval, then the coefficient on the target dummy should be positive and 
significant. Under the reverse causality argument outlined in Section 2.2, the coefficient should be 
negative and significant. The insignificant coefficients suggest that neither story appears to be an 
important component of the data generating process.  
Controlling for these factors, we find a higher switching propensity among both equity and debt 
                                                          
17 We use random effects as fixed-effects probit (or logit) suffers from an incidental parameters problem. In unreported 
robustness tests using bank fixed effects in a linear probability model, we find that the results are unaffected. 
18 Results are robust to alternative assumptions about the distribution of the error term, including: Random-effects logit; 
probit or logit without lead manager-specific random effects or without year effects; fixed-effects linear probability 
models; complementary log-log (extreme value) distribution; and Gompertz distribution (results available on request).  
  
14
issuers following mergers involving a bank serving a top 3 firm (the treatment group). In column 
(1), equity issuers in the treatment group are more prone to switching, both compared to mergers 
that involve no client overlap (control group 1; p=0.043) and when there has been no merger 
(control group 2, the base category in column (1); p=0.042); there is no difference in switching 
between control groups 1 and 2 (p=0.860). In column (3), debt issuers in the treatment group switch 
more often than firms in control group 1 (p=0.076) and those in control group 2 (p=0.010).  
Economically, the treatment effects are very large. The average switching rate in the equity 
treatment group is 31.1 and 31.4 percentage points greater than in control groups 1 and 2, 
respectively, holding all other covariates in col. (1) at their sample means. The corresponding 
numbers for the debt treatment group shown in col. (3) are 27.5 and 34.7 percentage points, 
respectively. These differences are in line with those reported earlier for the bivariate comparison, 
indicating that the control variables included in Table 4 have little effect on this result. Like the 
bivariate difference-in-differences test, the probit results provide evidence against the null of 
random matching: Issuing firms do switch underwriters following mergers that upset the 
equilibrium match between banks and firms in their industry.  
The evidence regarding sharing underwriters with smaller firms (those ranked 4th through 10th) 
is more mixed. While the coefficients are positive for both equity and debt issuers, we find a 
statistically significant effect only in the debt sample (see column (3)).  
In columns (2) and (4) we exclude control group 2 to focus on firms whose previous lead 
manager has undergone a merger since the issuer’s last deal. The positive coefficients estimated for 
firms in the treatment group confirm that it is a merger with a bank that has relationships with other 
large firms in the industry, rather than a merger per se, that induces greater switching. This provides 




3. Evidence from Deregulation 
The results of the bank-merger test support the interpretation that firms are reluctant to share 
underwriters. What accounts for this reluctance? As we outlined in the introduction, three plausible 
explanations are concerns about capacity constraints, conflicts of interest (for example, in takeover 
contests), or information leakage. As we argued, product-market contact is a necessary condition 
only for the information leakage story. Firms in the same industry that are shielded from 
competition by statute should be just as concerned about capacity constraints and conflicts of 
interest as firms that compete with each other in the product-market. If capacity constraints and 
conflicts of interest lead to disutility from sharing underwriters, product-market deregulation should 
make no difference to their underwriter choices. However, if choices reflect concerns about 
information leakage, we expect firms without product-market rivals to be indifferent to sharing 
underwriters prior to deregulation, because such leakage would not put them at a strategic 
disadvantage absent competition, while their reluctance should increase following deregulation. 
3.1 Identification and Modeling  
To test this prediction, we focus on transactions from those four-digit SIC codes that are subject 
to a significant deregulatory (competition-increasing) shock over the sample period, as identified by 
Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon (2005), a standard textbook on regulation and antitrust. We list 
these in Table A1 in the Appendix. Examples include the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act, the partial 
deregulation of the trucking industry in the 1980 Motor Carrier Reform Act, and the 1992 Energy 
Policy Act which introduced wholesale competition in electrical power. Twenty-three of the 
deregulating industries identified by Viscusi et al. are represented in our sample.  
Under the null that capacity constraints or conflicts of interest account for issuers’ reluctance to 
share underwriters, we expect issuers to avoid choosing underwriters that serve other large firms in 
their industry, both before and after deregulation. Under the alternative hypothesis of information 
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leakage, we expect issuers to be indifferent to a bank’s other relationships before deregulation but to 
avoid their rivals’ relationship banks after deregulation.  
Due to the small number of cases in the intersection of bank mergers and deregulating 
industries, we cannot adapt the difference-in-differences approach of Section 2. Instead, we estimate 
a standard model of underwriter choice (see, for instance, Bharat et al. (2007), Yasuda (2005), or 
Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006, 2007)). The unit of observation is a potential firm-bank 
pairing. The firm, having decided on the form of financing (i.e., debt or equity), chooses one or 
more banks to act as lead manager. Following Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2007), we take 
the issuer’s choice set to be the 50 largest banks by market share.19 Their combined market share 
averages 96.5% in the equity market and 99.5% in the debt market.  
Identification should come from the deregulation events and not some unobserved confounding 
events. Ideally, therefore, we would want to restrict the sample to a narrow window before and after 
each deregulation event. Sample size considerations lead us choose a ten-year window centered on a 
deregulation event. This leaves us with 126 equity and 570 debt transactions.  
Each issuing firm k is modeled as having a utility kjtjtkjtjtkjt xRu εηνβα ++++=    associated 
with giving each of the 50 competing banks j a lead manager mandate, where Rjt = 1 if bank j 
already has another large client in the issuer’s four-digit SIC industry, the xkj are other determinants 
of lead manager choice, tν  and jη  are year and bank-specific effects, respectively, and εkj is an 
observation-specific idiosyncratic shock that is assumed to have a normal distribution. Faced with 
these utilities over choices, each firm chooses the bank associated with the greatest utility. The 
resulting model is estimated as a standard multivariate probit.20 
As in the bank-merger test, we control for the strength of the firm’s relationship with the 
                                                          
19 By construction, a commercial bank is treated as competing for a lead-management mandate prior to the repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act only if it had a so called Section 20 subsidiary with the relevant securities underwriting authority. 
20 Our results are robust to alternative assumptions about the distribution of the error term, including random-effects 
logit and fixed-effects linear probability models. These results are available on request. 
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candidate bank, the four proxies for bank’s reputation, log firm sales, and lead manager and year 
effects. Unlike in the bank-merger test, we cannot rely on a difference-in-differences argument to 
remove biases due to omitted variables. A likely omitted variable is a bank’s industry expertise, 
which correlates both with serving other large firms in the industry and with a higher selection 
probability. We therefore include a proxy for industry expertise, measured as the combined 
concurrent product-market share of a bank’s clients in the issuer’s four-digit SIC industry. Product-
market shares are computed from annual Compustat net sales data.  
3.2 Results  
To test the hypothesis that exposure to competition makes firms more reluctant to share 
underwriters, we allow the slope coefficients to vary between deals completed before the year of the 
first deregulatory shock (“pre”) and those completed afterwards (“post”).21 The results shown in 
Table 5 support this hypothesis. In deals completed pre-deregulation, the effect of a bank having 
served one of the three largest firms in the issuer’s industry is insignificant, suggesting that issuers 
were indifferent to whether a bank serves other large clients in the industry with whom they had no 
product-market contact. Post-deregulation, in contrast, the coefficient is significantly negative in the 
equity market (p=0.009). In the debt market, it is large and negative but somewhat imprecisely 
estimated (p=0.114). Moreover, we find evidence that debt issuers avoid underwriters serving 
smaller rivals (those ranked fourth through tenth in their industry) post-deregulation. A Wald test 
rejects the equality of the rival-client coefficients pre- and post-deregulation in the equity sample 
(p=0.058)22 though not in the debt sample (p=0.284). This suggests that product-market contact 
contributes to firms’ apparent reluctance to share underwriters with other large firms in their 
industry, particularly in the equity market. 
                                                          
21 In some instances, industries were deregulated in phases. It is reasonable for everyone to assume that once 
deregulation starts, it will continue. We therefore focus on the first significant deregulation event in each industry. 
22 The bank-specific effects are insignificant. Dropping them, this Wald test is significant with a p-value of 0.013. 
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Might this result be driven by omitted variables? Deregulation events may, to some extent, 
coincide with banking deregulation. This could mechanically drive our result if entry into the 
securities underwriting market reduces a bank’s likelihood of serving multiple large clients. While 
our specifications include year and bank-specific effects, these may not be sufficient to completely 
remove potential omitted variable biases. We therefore turn to a Monte Carlo simulation.  
Under the information leakage hypothesis, we expect a change in the degree of reluctance to 
hire a bank that serves a large rival only among issuers whose industries are being deregulated. In 
non-deregulating industries, we expect no significant change around the deregulation dates, unless 
those dates coincide with other, unobserved developments that affect all industries to some extent.  
To test this counterfactual, we draw 500 random samples of 13 non-deregulating industries each 
(without replacement), match each industry randomly to one of the six deregulation dates shown in 
Table A1 that are relevant for the equity sample, and then test whether the “pre” and “post” 
coefficients estimated for the rival-client variable are different when we re-estimate the Table 5 
specification for equity issuers in these non-deregulating industries. Using a Wald test as above, we 
reject the null of equal coefficients at the 5% level in 28 of 500 simulations (5.6%). This indicates 
the test has near-perfect size.  
In sum, based on the Table 5 results, we are “94.2% confident” (1-0.058) that there is a change 
in the reluctance to share underwriters among equity issuers from deregulating industries, and based 
on the simulation evidence, we are “94.4% confident” (1-0.056) that there is no corresponding, 
contemporaneous change in the reluctance to share underwriters in non-deregulating industries. 
Economically, the effects in Table 5 are large. Post-deregulation, a relationship with an issuer’s 
top 3 rival reduces a bank’s chances of lead-managing an equity deal by 32.8%, from the one in 50 
unconditional likelihood, holding all other covariates at their sample means. Compared to the two 
variables identified in prior work as the main determinants of underwriter choice, the effect of rival 
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relationships is larger than that of a one-standard-deviation increase in bank-issuer relationships 
(+13.7%) or the bank’s reputation (+20.3%, as measured by eigenvector). The pattern is similar 
though economically smaller for debt issuers.  
Summarizing the effects of the controls, we find that a candidate bank’s chances of becoming 
lead manager improve significantly, the stronger its prior underwriting relationship with the issuer; 
the greater its market share and reputational standing; and the greater its industry expertise. These 
findings mirror those in the bank-merger test presented in Section 2. 
4. Evidence from Client Switching 
The evidence in Section 3 is most consistent with the hypothesis that firms avoid sharing banks 
due to concerns that confidential information might be leaked to rivals. If the information leakage 
hypothesis is true, information concerns may be offset not only by greater industry expertise as 
argued before, but also by the potential for a firm to benefit from sharing a bank because it might 
learn useful information about a rival. That is, there are both costs and benefits to information 
leakage. We now attempt to disentangle these costs and benefits, and in so doing, estimate the 
economic magnitude of the costs under the maintained assumption of information leakage.  
4.1 Identification 
Identification exploits firms’ responses to a rival discontinuing a banking relationship. Our 
identifying assumption is that a rival’s switch away from its former relationship bank presents an 
attractive opportunity for other firms in the industry. This bank has both general industry expertise 
and specific knowledge of the rival, both of which are beneficial to an issuer, but following the end 
of the relationship with the rival, there is no longer a risk of information leakage. In contrast, banks 
that continue to serve rivals have general industry expertise and offer both an information benefit 
(in the form of specific knowledge of the rival) and an information cost (in the form of possible 
information leakage). By comparing the propensity of firms to match with these two types of 
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underwriters, we can isolate the cost of information leaking to a rival via a shared underwriter. 
This identification strategy makes three assumptions:  
1) A bank’s industry expertise and other unobserved quality attributes are unaffected by the  
switch, at least within the timeframe after the switch we consider.  
2) The information benefit is unaffected by the switch. 
3) The client switch is orthogonal to any bank unobservables, i.e., the switch is exogenous.  
Assumption 3) would be violated if firms switch underwriters when quality of service has 
deteriorated. Thus, we run the risk of our treated banks being poor quality relative to the untreated 
set, which would decrease the estimated magnitude of the cost of information leakage. Conversely, 
a firm may switch because it knows that its usual underwriter will soon work for a competitor, 
reducing its capacity. Or having lost a client, a bank may cut its fees in an effort to keep its industry 
desk occupied.23 In either case, a positive correlation between the probability that a given bank is 
chosen as lead manager and the fact that it has recently lost a client would be unrelated to 
information leakage, and so we would overestimate the information leakage effect.  
To address possible biases introduced by these sorts of stories, we use merger activity among 
issuing firms to identify plausibly exogenous switches, in addition to a more data-driven definition 
of a discontinued relationship. We discuss the precise nature of these two approaches below. 
4.2 Discontinued Relationships 
We focus on two types of discontinued relationships. First, we consider a firm’s rival to have 
switched relationship banks if the rival was acquired by another firm at some point in the five years 
preceding the deal for which an issuing company is selecting a lead manager. We use CRSP 
delisting codes 200 and 300 to identify acquisitions. Our maintained assumption is that the (rival) 
merged firm’s CFO will most likely use the bank with which he has an existing relationship, leaving 
                                                          
23 However, coding lost clients as in Section 4.2 below, we find no evidence that banks cut fees after losing clients, 
controlling for other common determinants of fees as in Section 5 below. 
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the target’s relationship bank in the position of having lost an important (rival) client.  
The second type of switch exploits variation in the duration of relationships. We deem a firm’s 
rival to have switched if it has awarded no underwriting business to its previous relationship bank 
for T years. T is arbitrary, and we report results for T=3 and T=5. Within T years of its most recent 
deal, a rival firm is coded as an active client of the bank’s. After T years, it is coded as a former or 
inactive client. We assume the bank’s information about the rival client to decay following a switch, 
and so code the bank as having an inactive rival client for only one year following the switch (i.e., 
in year T+1). Beyond that, the bank is coded as no longer having a rival client in the industry. 
4.3 Estimation 
We implement the client-switching identification strategy by adapting the probit model of the 
previous section. Specifically, we adjust the reduced-form utility of a company k choosing bank j, 





jtkjt xRRu εηνβγα +++++=    
where nsjtR  = 1 if bank j has a large rival client in the issuer’s industry and that client has not 
switched (i.e., it remains an active rival client) and sjtR  = 1 if the bank had a large rival client that 
has recently switched (i.e., an inactive rival client). We estimate this model in the whole sample 
(not just for deregulating industries). This sample is described in block (2) of Table 2. 
To see where identification is coming from, we decompose αˆ  and γˆ . Let 
αˆ  = industry expertise + information benefit + information cost  
γˆ  = industry expertise + information benefit 
so that   γα ˆˆ −  = information cost  
The function γα ˆˆ −  can be constructed from estimated parameters; standard errors are computed 
using the delta method (see Greene (2003, p. 916)). Under the hypothesis that firms avoid sharing 
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underwriters to minimize the risk of information leakage, the sign of γα ˆˆ −  should be negative. 
4.4 Results 
Table 6 reports the three probit specifications, using firm mergers and client switches with T=3 
and T=5, respectively, to identify active and inactive rival clients. To conserve space, we report 
only the coefficients estimated for the active and inactive rival relationship dummies and the 
difference between the two. As per the above decomposition, this difference measures the net effect 
of concerns about information leakage. The control variables behave in line with those shown in the 
deregulation models in Table 5.24 
The results provide support for the hypothesis that information spillover concerns have a first-
order effect on firms’ choice of lead manager. The function γα ˆˆ −  is consistently negative and 
significant in five of the six specifications for the case of top 3 rivals. The economic magnitude of 
the information cost, shown in the columns labeled dF/dx, is very large. An equity issuer, for 
instance, is around 55% less likely to choose a bank that presents a risk of information leakage than 
one that does not. Debt issuers have a zero probability of choosing such a bank.  
Relationships with smaller rivals (those ranked fourth through tenth in an industry) also have a 
negative effect on a bank’s chances of being hired as lead manager, though this effect is both 
statistically and economically weaker. 
Finally, note that γˆ  is not only mostly positive and significant but also frequently large 
economically. Depending on the specification, a bank is between 42% and 132% more likely to be 
chosen if it used to have relationships with one of the issuer’s main rivals. This suggests that 
industry expertise and an intimate knowledge of key rivals do play a key role in underwriter 
selection, consistent with our identification strategy. 
                                                          
24 Our results are robust to alternative assumptions about the distribution of the error term, including random-effects 
logit and fixed-effects linear probability models. These results are available on request. 
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5. The Price of Exclusivity 
Deregulation allows us to explore possible pricing consequences of a reluctance to share banks. 
If such a reluctance is well-founded (reflecting, say, information spillover concerns), it reduces an 
issuer’s effective choice set and thus competition. Depending on the magnitude of information 
leakage concerns, it may even give the bank hold-up power because ending a relationship may 
increase the risk that the bank will spill its knowledge of the issuer to future clients.25 As a result, 
banks may charge higher underwriting fees after deregulation.  
So far, we have implicitly modeled fees as a component of unobserved bank characteristics, for 
the simple reason that we cannot observe fees in the entire choice set: Fees quoted by banks that 
didn’t win an underwriting mandate are not publicly disclosed. But we can exploit the deregulation 
events to test whether banks exploit their increased bargaining power by increasing fees as firms in 
deregulating industries begin to have concerns about sharing underwriters.  
We estimate standard fee regressions, where the dependent variable is the fee (or “gross 
spread”) paid to the underwriter or underwriting syndicate, measured as a fraction of issue proceeds 
times 100. The main variable of interest is an indicator identifying deals from deregulating 
industries completed after a competition-increasing deregulation event. We control for economies 
of scale in underwriting by including issue proceeds and log issue proceeds (see Ljungqvist, 
Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003)) and for issuer and offer characteristics. We also include lead 
manager fixed effects and year effects. Collectively, these controls account for between 31.2% and 
73.2% of the variation in fees in Table 7. 
Column (1) shows that average fees increased by 91 basis points in the equity sample post-
deregulation.26 In column (2), we restrict the sample to deals occurring in a ten-year window 
                                                          
25 For an analysis of hold-up in lending relationships, see Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), and Petersen and Rajan (1995). 
26 To the extent that regulated industries are more transparent, it may be that deregulation raised underwriting costs as 
risk discovery and disclosure became more burdensome. If so, this may introduce an upward bias to our estimates. 
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centered on each industry’s first deregulatory event. This reduces the estimated fee increase, post-
deregulation, to 52 basis points. Debt offerings display similar patterns, with fees estimated to 
increase post-deregulation by 38 basis points in the full sample (see column (3) or by 83 basis 
points when we impose the ten-year window (see column (4)). The evidence from both equity and 
debt fees thus supports the view that a reluctance to share underwriters enables banks to charge 
higher fees for their services.27 Monte Carlo simulations along the lines of Section 3.2 again confirm 
that there are no corresponding changes in fees in non-deregulating industries. 
6. Implications for Vertical Relationships in Investment Banking  
Our evidence indicates that large firms, when issuing securities, are reluctant to share a bank 
with a product-market rival, contributing to the low incidence of banks working for multiple large 
clients in an industry as shown in Fig. 1. The deregulation test suggests that a likely driving force is 
concerns about possible information leakage. We now explore how these findings affect how we 
interpret the changing structure of vertical relationships in the U.S. investment banking industry.  
The most notable force shaping the structure of the investment banking industry over the last 
two decades has been deregulation of the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment 
banking. In a series of steps beginning in 1987, commercial banks were allowed to enter securities 
underwriting, culminating in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. 
From the point of view of an issuing firm, entry expands the set of banks that are unencumbered 
by a prior relationship with a rival. This makes the entrant an attractive choice relative to many 
incumbents. Assuming firms felt constrained in their underwriter choices, we would expect that the 
effects documented in the paper have made entry easier, as commercial banks unencumbered by 
existing relationships were in a relatively good position to gain market share as Glass-Steagall 
                                                          
27 Fees may increase post-deregulation simply because deregulation itself increases demand for external capital while 
the supply of underwriting services in the short-run is fixed. In unreported regressions, we include the amount of capital 
raised in the same year or quarter by other firms in the same industry but find no systematic evidence that fees are 
impacted by this. Similarly, controlling for the number of deals done by firms in the same industry has no effect. 
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constraints were relaxed. A specific prediction that follows is that we should observe an increased 
propensity for firms to establish multiple banking relationships, as entry increases the number of 
banks toward the point where firms can maintain multiple relationships without having to share 
bankers. In this section, we present evidence that is consistent with this prediction.  
Figures 3a and 3b show the annual number of commercial banks active in equity and debt 
underwriting in the U.S., respectively, as well as their combined market share. Entry by commercial 
banks appears to have been very successful, especially after 1999. As a group, commercial banks 
captured 70% of the debt underwriting market and 38% of the equity underwriting market by 2004. 
A handful of commercial banks, including Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase, emerged as substantial 
competitors to the incumbent investment banks.  
Figures 4a and 4b show the extent to which issuing firms have tended to concentrate their 
underwriting business with a single bank. We measure this by calculating the total amount raised by 
each issuing firm in a given window and then looking at how this was shared among the one or 
more banks acting as lead manager. (For the purposes of the figures, we use one-, two-, and three-
year windows.) From this we construct a Herfindahl index of the concentration of each issuer’s 
bank relationships. A Herfindahl of one indicates an exclusive bank relationship. We then take a 
weighted average over firms in a quarter, weighting by the total proceeds raised by each firm over 
the relevant window. Weighting has the effect of reducing average exclusivity, indicating that larger 
issuers are more likely to have more than one relationship bank.  
The patterns in Figures 4a and 4b are striking. Prior to the mid 1990s, bank relationships were 
nearly all exclusive. They have since become considerably less exclusive. For the average equity 
issuer, concentration has fallen from around 0.95 to between 0.62 and 0.7 in 2003Q4, depending on 
the window used, suggesting that by the end of the sample period, the dominant model is no longer 
an exclusive-bank relationship but a set of multiple relationships around a core bank that is awarded 
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a disproportionate share of the average issuer’s underwriting business. This may be the result of 
efforts to engender competition among banks.28 In the debt market, the decline in exclusivity has 
been even steeper. By the end of the sample period, average relationship concentration had fallen to 
between 0.39 and 0.47, depending on the window, a level consistent with a stable two- or three-
bank relationship. These data are consistent with the prediction that increased entry makes it easier 
for firms to establish multiple investment banking relationships. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper presents evidence suggesting that firms seek to avoid sharing investment bankers 
with their product-market rivals when possible. To establish this finding, the paper uses a range of 
novel sources of identification aimed at isolating margins on which any such disinclination would 
have a meaningful economic effect. 
What might cause such behavior? The results best support the hypothesis that firms seek to 
avoid sharing underwriters in order to avoid commercially sensitive information leaking to rival 
firms. Unlike alternatives, this hypothesis predicts that the propensity to avoid sharing underwriters 
appears important only when firms have direct product-market contact with other large firms in 
their industry. Evidence using deregulation events is consistent with this view. 
Whatever the reason for the reluctance to share underwriters, we find that banks appear to set 
higher prices as firms become more concerned about the risk of sharing underwriters. This suggests 
that a desire to avoid sharing underwriters limits firms’ choice set and, hence, effective competition. 
It constrains competition because, with a limited number of banks capable of executing large or 
complex deals, there may simply be too few banks to allow each firm to have multiple relationships 
while at the same time avoiding sharing banks with a major rival. At the very least, this constrains 
the issuer’s choice set of underwriters. However, paradoxically, the same phenomenon may also act 
                                                          
28 Alternatively, it is possible that commercial banks leaned on their borrowers to share their underwriting business in 
return for preferential loan terms (Drucker and Puri (2005)). 
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as an aid to entry: An entering bank benefits from being unencumbered by existing relationships 





Anand, Bharat, and Alexander Galetovic, 2000, Information, non-excludability and financial market 
structure, Journal of Business 73, 357-402. 
Anand, Bharat, and Alexander Galetovic, 2006, Relationships, competition, and the structure of the 
investment banking market, Journal of Industrial Economics 54, 151-199. 
Ashenfelter, Orley, and David Card, 1985, Using the longitudinal structure of earnings to estimate 
the effect of training programs, Review of Economics and Statistics 67, 648-660. 
Asker, John, 2004, Diagnosing vertical foreclosure due to exclusive dealing, NYU Stern Working 
Paper EC-04-36. 
Azoulay, Pierre, 2004, Capturing knowledge across and within firm boundaries: Evidence from 
clinical development, American Economic Review 94, 1591-1612. 
Baccara, Mariagiovanna, 2005, Outsourcing, information leakage, and consulting firms, RAND 
Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
Baccara, Mariagiovanna, and Ronny Razin, 2004, From thought to practice: Appropriation and 
endogenous market structure with imperfect intellectual property rights, CEPR DP No. 4419. 
Berger, Allen N., Nathan H. Miller, Mitchell A. Petersen, Raghuram G. Rajan, and Jeremy C. Stein, 
2005, Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and 
small banks, Journal of Financial Economics 76, 237-269.  
Bharat, Sreedhar, Sandeep Dahiya, Anthony Saunders, and Anand Srinivasan, 2007, So what do I 
get? The bank’s view of lending relationships, Journal of Financial Economics 85, 368-419. 
Bhattacharya, Sudipto, and Chiesa Gabriella, 1995, Proprietary information, financial 
intermediation, and research incentives, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 4, 328-357. 
Bonacich, Philip, 1972, Factoring and weighting approaches to status scores and clique 
identification, Journal of Mathematical Sociology 2, 113-120. 
Boot, Arnoud W.A., 2000, Relationship banking: What do we know?, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 9, 7-25. 
Competition Commission, 1999, Underwriting services for share offers: A report on the supply in 
the UK of underwriting services for share offers, Competition Commission Report, HM Govt. 
Denis, David J., 1991, Shelf registration and the market for seasoned equity offerings, Journal of 
Business 64, 189-212. 
Drucker, Steven, and Manju Puri, 2005, On the benefits of concurrent lending and underwriting, 
Journal of Finance 60, 2763-2799. 
  
29
Eccles, Robert G., and Dwight B. Crane, 1988, Doing Deals: Investment Banks at Work, Harvard 
Business School Press. 
Ellis, Katrina, Roni Michaely, and Maureen O’Hara, 2005, Competition in investment banking: 
Proactive, reactive, or retaliatory?, Unpublished working paper, Cornell University. 
Fernando, Chitru S., Vladimir A. Gatchev, and Paul A. Spindt, 2005, Wanna dance? How firms and 
underwriters choose each other, Journal of Finance 60, 2437-2470. 
Foster, F. Douglas, 1989, Syndicate size, spreads, and market power during the introduction of shelf 
registration, Journal of Finance 44, 195-204. 
Gande, Amar, Manju Puri, and Anthony Saunders, 1999, Bank entry, competition and the market 
for corporate securities underwriting, Journal of Financial Economics 54, 165-195. 
Gande, Amar, Manju Puri, Anthony Saunders, and Ingo Walter, 1997, Bank underwriting of debt 
securities: Modern evidence, Review of Financial Studies 10, 1175-1202. 
Gilbert, Richard J., and Justine S. Hastings, 2005, Market power, vertical integration, and the 
wholesale price of gasoline, Journal of Industrial Economics 53, 469-492. 
Greene, William H., 2003, Econometric Analysis, Prentice Hall. 
Hahn, Avital L., 2003, Playing both sides: Settlement aside, banks – and even clients – still have 
trouble staying with one horse, Investment Dealers Digest, 18 August. 
Ho, Katherine, 2007, Insurer-provider networks in the medical care market, NBER Working Paper 
11822. 
Hortascu, Ali, and Chad Syverson, 2007, Cementing relationships: Vertical integration, foreclosure, 
productivity, and prices, Journal of Political Economy 115, 250-301. 
Ivashina, Victoria, Vinay B. Nair, Anthony Saunders, Nadia Massoud, and Roger Stover, 2005, The 
role of banks in takeovers, Unpublished working paper, New York University. 
Krigman, Laurie, Wayne H. Shaw, and Kent L. Womack, 2001, Why do firms switch underwriters? 
Journal of Financial Economics 60, 245–284. 
Landier, Augustin, Vinay Nair, and Julie Wulf, 2006, Trade-offs in staying close: Corporate 
decision-making and geographic dispersion, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming. 
Leander, Tom, 1999, The best mergers, Global Finance, February 1. 
Ljungqvist, Alexander, Tim Jenkinson, and William J. Wilhelm, 2003, Global integration in 
primary equity markets, Review of Financial Studies 16, 63-99. 
Ljungqvist, Alexander, Felicia Marston, and William J. Wilhelm, 2006, Competing for securities 
underwriting mandates, Journal of Finance 61, 301-340. 
  
30
Ljungqvist, Alexander, Felicia Marston, and William J. Wilhelm, 2007, Scaling the hierarchy: How 
and why investment banks compete for syndicate co-management appointments, Unpublished 
working paper, New York University. 
Ljungqvist, Alexander, and William J. Wilhelm, 2005, Does prospect theory explain IPO market 
behavior?, Journal of Finance 60, 1759-1790. 
Megginson, William L., and Kathleen A. Weiss, 1991, Venture capitalist certification in initial 
public offerings, Journal of Finance 46, 879-903. 
Petersen, Mitchell A., and Raghuram G. Rajan, 1995, The effect of credit market competition on 
lending relationships, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 407–443. 
Petersen, Mitchell A., and Raghuram G. Rajan, 2002, Does distance still matter? The revolution in 
small business lending, Journal of Finance 57, 2533–2570. 
Rajan, Raghuram G., 1992, Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm’s-length 
debt, Journal of Finance 47, 1367-1400. 
Rey, Patrick, and Jean Tirole, 2007, A primer on foreclosure, in: Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter 
(eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3, North-Holland. 
Sharpe, Steven A., 1990, Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: A stylized 
model of customer relationships, Journal of Finance 45, 1069-1087.  
Siconolfi, Michael, 1994, Saga of Kidder’s Jett: Sudden downfall of an aggressive Wall Street 
trader, Wall Street Journal, April 19. 
Sikora, Martin, 2000, Premier investment banks form global giants, Mergers and Acquisitions 
(October 1, 2000). 
Song, Wei-ling, 2004, The industrial organization of bond underwriting market with bank entry: 
Evidence from underwriting fees, Unpublished working paper, Louisiana State University. 
Stuart, Alix. N., 2006, Are your secrets safe?, CFO Magazine, October 2006. 
Tirole, Jean, 1987, The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press. 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Joseph E. Harrington, and John M. Vernon, 2005, Economics of Regulation and 
Antitrust, The MIT Press. 
Weidner, David, 1999, Deal for middle-tier broker seen as cautious move for third-biggest bank, 
American Banker, September 29. 
Yasuda, Ayako, 2005, Do bank relationships affect the firm’s underwriter choice in the corporate-
bond underwriting market?, Journal of Finance 60, 1259-1292. 
Zabojnik, Jan, 2002, A theory of trade secrets in firms, International Economic Review 43, 831-
855. 
Figure 1a. Exclusivity of Bank-firm Equity Relationships 
The graphs show the quarterly fraction of equity or debt underwriters with multiple clients among the three, five, or ten 
largest firms in a four-digit SIC industry (ranked by Compustat net sales), conditional on having at least one such client. We 
code a bank as having a client in industry i in quarter t if it has lead managed one or more securities issues for a firm in that 
industry over the five years ending in quarter t-1. The variables are constructed using underwriting data from Thomson 


























































































































Figure 2. Annual Number of Bank Mergers 
The figure shows the annual number of bank mergers. We distinguish three cases: Mergers between two investment banks 
(IB-IB); mergers between two commercial banks (CB-CB); and acquisitions of investment banks by commercial banks (CB-
IB). We continue to call a commercial bank a commercial bank after it has acquired an investment bank. We include all 
mergers (and in two cases, joint ventures of the two banks’ capital markets divisions) by any bank involved in securities 
underwriting in the U.S. capital markets, according to Thomson Financial, between 1970 and 2003. As a consequence, the 
figure includes mergers between foreign banks, such as the 1984 merger between two Canadian commercial banks, Harris 














































Figure 3a. Number and Combined Equity Market Share of Commercial Banks 
The graphs show the combined equity (in 3a) and debt (in 3b) market share of commercial banks (on the right-hand axis) and 
the number of commercial banks that have positive market share in each year (on the left-hand axis). Deregulation began in 
1987 and the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed in 1999. There is underwriting by commercial banks prior to 1987 as some 
banks had grandfathered underwriting rights; due to the inclusion of foreign banks active in the U.S. capital markets; and 
























































































































Figure 4a. Concentration of Bank-firm Equity Relationships 
The graphs show the Herfindahl concentration index of bank-firm relationships, measured over the prior one, two, or three 



























































































































Table 1. Exclusivity of Bank-firm Relationships and Proxies for Secrecy 
This table provides descriptive statistics consistent with the notion that exclusivity is more prevalent in industries where 
the demand for secrecy may be a higher. As in Figures 1a and 1b, we compute the quarterly fraction of equity or debt 
underwriters with multiple clients among the three largest firms in a four-digit SIC industry (ranked by Compustat net 
sales), conditional on having at least one such client. A larger fraction implies less client exclusivity. We then compute 
the time-series average such fraction for each of three sample splits, and test for equality of fractions for each sample 
split using a standard Z-test. To proxy for the demand for secrecy, we split four-digit SIC industries a) at the median 
Herfindahl concentration index, b) at the median asset tangibility, and c) according to whether information is 
predominantly “hard” or “soft” in the industry. The Herfindahl concentration index is computed as the sum of the 
squared market shares of firms in the industry, based on Compustat net sales. The median value in the sample of 
industries with securities issuers in our sample is 0.332. An industry’s asset tangibility is defined as the industry’s 
median ratio of property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item #8) divided by total assets (Compustat item #6). The 
definitions of hard and soft information follow Landier, Nair, and Wulf (2006) who compare two snapshots (1987 and 
1998) of the mean distance between firms and bank lenders per industry at the 2-digit SIC level. In industries that are 
predominantly characterized by hard information, they expect mean distance to have increased as banks have begun to 
rely more on impersonal means to collect information, whereas in soft-information industries, banks need to stay closer 
to their corporate borrowers and so it is harder to increase geographic distance. A hard-information industry is then 
defined as one whose percentage increase in mean distance between 1987 and 1998 is above the median such increase 
across industries. The measure of distance to nearest bank is computed using data from the National Survey of Small 
Business Finances (1987 and 1998) conducted by the Federal Reserve. A small business is defined as a for-profit, non-
financial, non-farm, non-subsidiary business enterprise that had fewer than 500 employees and was in operation at the 
time of the survey. Where a business was served by more than one bank, the average distance across all relevant banks 
was computed for that business. Averages across businesses were computed taking into account the sampling weights 
from the survey. Observations where the distance was not recorded were omitted. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
    Equity  Debt 
     
Industry Herfindahl “concentrated” 
(above-median Herfindahl) 
1.5%  4.5% 
 “unconcentrated” 
(below-median Herfindahl) 
3.1%  12.2% 
 Z-statistic 9.95***  34.60*** 
     
Asset tangibility “predominantly intangible” 
(below-median PPE/total assets) 
2.0%  4.2% 
 “predominantly tangible” 
(above-median PPE/total assets) 
2.6%  11.4% 
 Z-statistic 4.13***  29.81*** 
     
Information “soft” 
(below-median distance increase) 
2.2%  6.9% 
 “hard” 
(above-median distance increase) 
2.6%  9.0% 
 Z-statistic 2.06**  9.44*** 
          
Table 2. The Sample of Capital-raising Transactions 
The first block of columns shows a breakdown of all capital-raising transactions listed in Thompson Financial’s SDC 
database completed between January 1975 and December 2003, after excluding non-underwritten issues; transactions 
by financial firms (SIC code 6) and government issuers (SIC code 9); and offerings by non-U.S. corporations. The 
second and third blocks of columns show the samples used in the econometric analyses. These samples are limited to 
deals lead-managed by one of the 50 largest underwriters active that year involving the ten largest firms (by Compustat 
net sales) in each four-digit SIC industry and exclude debt shelf offerings conducted under Rule 415. In addition, the 
third block screens out first-time deals. All currency amounts are in 1996 constant dollars, deflated using the quarterly 




Deals by the ten largest firms per industry 
underwritten by 50 largest banks 
 
All underwritten transactions  
completed in 1975 – 2003 (1)  
Excluding shelf 
offers (2)  
Excluding first-
time deals and 
























           
Equity offerings           
 Common stock 16,752 33.4 1,156,827 24.6  5,012 570,972  2,977 375,960 
 Private common 2,579 5.1 63,488 1.3  260 11,199  221 9,102 
Debt offerings            
 Non-convertible bonds 13,278 26.5 2,316,863 49.2  1,900 344,554  1,243 203,236 
 Convertible bonds 1,287 2.6 160,850 3.4  524 65,338  277 44,149 
 Private non-conv. bonds 12,248 24.4 764,347 16.2  3,739 261,410  2,446 173,066 
 Private conv. bonds 481 1.0 11,162 0.2  77 3,397  27 1,843 
  





 Convertible preferred 551 1.1 78,615 1.7  164 25,719  113 17,034 
 Private non-conv. pref. 747 1.5 22,337 0.5  78 3,776  49 2,398 
 Private conv. preferred 1,203 2.4 40,739 0.9  101 9,777  54 6,659 
              
All deals 50,128 100.0 4,710,441 100.0  12,016 1,314,732  7,539 848,940 
                    
 
Table 3. Main Variable Definitions 
 
Bank-rival relationships   
equity/debt relationship with a top 3 firm =1 if the bank has lead-managed at least one equity or debt issue for a 
firm ranked among the 3 largest firms in a four-digit SIC industry 
(ranked by Compustat net sales), excluding the issuer itself, in the 
prior five years. 
 
equity/debt relationship with a top 4-10 firm =1 if the bank has lead-managed at least one equity or debt issue for a 
firm ranked among the 4-10 largest firms in a four-digit SIC industry, 
excluding the issuer itself, in the prior five years. 
Strength of bank-firm relationships  
bank’s share of issuer’s equity/debt deals  Following Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006), let d tkjP ,,  denote 
the aggregate proceeds company k raised in deals lead-managed by 
bank j over the four quarters preceding quarter t in deals of type d = 
{equity, debt}. The strength of company k’s type-d relationship with 
bank j is ∑= j d tkjd tkjd tkj PPR ,,,,,, . This ranges from zero (no 
relationship) to 100% (if the company maintained an exclusive bank 
relationship). Constructed from Thomson Financial/SDC data.  
Bank reputation proxies  
equity/debt market share A bank’s share of the equity/debt underwriting market during the 
prior calendar year; see Megginson and Weiss (1991). Following a 
merger, the surviving bank is credited with both predecessors’ market 
shares. Underwriting data come from Thomson Financial/SDC. These 
variables are constructed using data for all issuers (not just the ten 
largest firms in each industry). 
 
eigenvector centrality  Measures a bank’s standing based on data on its syndication 
relationships with other banks; see Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm 
(2007). Assuming that status and influence derive, in part, from being 
networked to others who themselves are well-networked (Bonacich 
(1972)), we weight a bank’s ties to others by the importance of the 
banks it is tied to. Formally, eigenvector ∑=≡ i dtid tjid tjd tj EpE ,,,,, . The 
weights are the reciprocal of the principal eigenvector dtp  of a square 
and symmetric matrix d tjiA ,,  whose cells (i,j) record whether or not 
banks i and j syndicated one or more transactions of type d = {equity, 
debt} in the preceding year. Constructed using data for all issuers (not 
just the ten largest firms in each industry). 
 
loyalty index  Measures how often a bank retains its clients in consecutive deals as a 
control for unobserved factors such as execution capability that affect 
an issuer’s choice: Banks whose clients are generally loyal likely have 
more desirable characteristics; see Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara 
(2005). Let Ick and Irk = 1 if bank j managed k’s penultimate and most 
recent deals, respectively, in prior five years, and 0 otherwise. Then 
j’s loyalty index = Σk Ick Irk / Σk Ick (the number of retained clients 
over the total number of clients). The loyalty index varies between 
zero and 100%. Constructed using data for all issuers (not just the ten 
largest firms in each industry). 
Expertise  
bank’s industry expertise Measures a bank’s industry expertise as the combined concurrent 
product-market share of its clients in the issuer’s four-digit SIC 
industry. Product-market shares are computed from annual Compustat 
net sales data. 
Table 4. Lead Manager Switches Following Bank Mergers 
We estimate the probability that an issuing company switches lead managers in consecutive equity or debt deals. A switch 
is defined as an equity (debt) issuer hiring as lead manager any bank other than the lead manager of its most recent equity 
(debt) deal (or, if that bank has since been acquired, its successor). In the case of multiple lead managers on a deal, we code 
as a switch any failure to retain every lead manager from the previous deal. We focus on deals involving a firm ranked 
among the ten largest by Compustat net sales in its four-digit SIC industry that year. All variables are defined in Table 3, 
except log real sales which is based on Compustat net sales deflated using the 1985=100 quarterly GDP deflator. The bank 
variables refer to characteristics of the lead manager in the previous deal measured as of the time of the current deal. The 
models are estimated using probit with lead manager-specific random effects and year fixed effects. Results are robust to 
alternative assumptions about the distribution of the error term, including: Random-effects logit; probit or logit without lead 
manager-specific random effects or without year fixed effects; fixed-effects linear probability models; complementary log-
log (extreme value) distribution; and Gompertz distribution. Intercept and year fixed effects are not shown. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Equity  Debt 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treatment groups     
=1 if since previous deal, bank has merged with another bank that has  0.978** 1.068** 1.679*** 0.770 
     one or more clients among the 3 largest firms in issuer’s industry 0.481 0.506 0.651 0.684 
=1 if since previous deal, bank has merged with another bank that has  0.382 0.285 1.293* 0.889 
     one or more clients among 4-10 largest firms in issuer’s industry 0.296 0.305 0.759 0.777 
Control group 1     
=1 if bank involved in merger since previous deal but merger partner 0.015  0.710*  
     has no relationships in issuer’s industry 0.085  0.381  
Bank-firm relationships     
bank’s share of issuer’s debt deals as lead in prior four quarters -0.498*** -1.318*** -0.298*** -0.328 
 0.104 0.379 0.053 0.357 
bank’s share of issuer’s equity deals as lead in prior four quarters -0.342*** -0.601** -0.183** 0.422 
 0.073 0.267 0.089 0.567 
Bank characteristics     
bank’s equity market share in prior calendar year -0.187 -0.022 0.447 -1.191 
 0.693 1.970 0.424 5.309 
bank’s debt market share in prior calendar year -2.436*** -1.384 -0.685 2.158 
 0.747 1.716 0.588 4.688 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  -1.148*** -1.157 -0.460* 0.104 
 0.294 0.738 0.239 1.660 
bank’s loyalty index -0.985*** -0.851** -0.727*** -2.014** 
 0.118 0.364 0.126 0.800 
=1 if previous lead was target in bank merger 0.052 -0.093 -0.272 -0.442 
 0.122 0.140 0.220 0.274 
Firm characteristics       
ln (1+ real sales in $m) 0.099*** 0.044 0.115*** 0.211*** 
 0.016 0.040 0.015 0.070 
ln (1+ years since previous deal) 0.401*** 0.386*** 0.252*** 0.334 
 0.049 0.104 0.040 0.254 
Diagnostics     
Pseudo R2 17.6 %  17.7 %  6.4 %  25.9 % 
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 559.4***  112.2***  317.0***  67.1** 
Wald test: coefficient on rival 3 = coefficient on control group 1 (χ2) 4.1**  n.a.  3.2*  n.a. 
LR test: ρ = 0 (χ2) 5.1**  1.5  8.3***  0.0 
No. of observations    3,198        630      4,341        296 
Table 5. Lead Manager Choice in Deregulating Industries 
We estimate the probability that a given bank is chosen to lead-manage a particular securities transaction over the period 
1975 to 2003. We focus on transactions involving a firm ranked among the ten largest by Compustat net sales in its four-
digit SIC industry that year, and treat the 50 largest underwriters by market share that year as being in competition for each 
deal. (Note there were only 35 banks active in equity underwriting in 1975 and there were fewer than 50 banks active in 
debt underwriting in 1975-1980 and in 2002.) The unit of observation is a bank-deal pair. The dependent variable equals 1 
if the bank won the lead-management mandate and 0 otherwise. We restrict the sample to deals from four-digit SIC codes 
that are subject to a significant deregulatory (competition-increasing) shock between 1975 and 2003, as identified by 
Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon (2005). Twenty-three of these deregulating industries have equity or debt transactions in 
the sample; see Table A1 in the Appendix for a list of deregulation events. The debt sample also excludes shelf 
registrations. To test the hypothesis that exposure to competition makes firms more reluctant to share underwriters, we 
allow the slope coefficients to vary between deals completed in the five years before the year of the first deregulatory shock 
(“Pre”) and those completed in the following five years (“Post”). All variables are defined in Table 3, except log real sales 
which is based on Compustat net sales deflated using the 1985=100 quarterly GDP deflator. The models are estimated 
using probit with lead manager-specific random effects and year and industry fixed effects. Results are robust to alternative 
assumptions about the distribution of the error term. Intercept and fixed effects are not shown. Standard errors are shown in 
italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 Equity  Debt 
 Pre Post  Pre Post 
Bank-rival relationships      
=1 if bank has one or more clients among the 3 largest firms in ind. 0.072 -1.060*** -0.058 -0.248 
 0.447 0.406 0.086 0.157 
=1 if bank has one or more clients among the 4-10 largest firms in ind. 0.163 -0.079 -0.102 -0.327** 
 0.425 0.220 0.080 0.146 
Bank-firm relationships     
bank’s share of issuer’s debt deals as lead in prior four quarters 1.161* 1.794*** 0.987*** 1.357*** 
 0.632 0.293 0.195 0.113 
bank’s share of issuer’s equity deals as lead in prior four quarters 1.999*** 1.383*** 3.370*** 0.443** 
 0.493 0.327 0.612 0.215 
Bank characteristics     
bank’s equity market share in prior calendar year -3.737 -0.855 -1.064 1.371*** 
 2.766 1.507 0.937 0.522 
bank’s debt market share in prior calendar year 5.465* 5.179*** 1.023 1.342* 
 2.354 1.365 1.425 0.796 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  1.127 1.596*** 0.797 1.208*** 
 0.783 0.594 0.543 0.393 
bank’s loyalty index -0.408 0.164 0.553*** 0.653*** 
 0.293 0.252 0.198 0.130 
bank’s industry expertise 3.806** 3.277*** 5.133*** 2.483*** 
 1.813 0.745 0.549 0.313 
Firm characteristics     
ln (1+ real sales in $m) 0.023 -0.062 0.005 -0.008 
 0.072 0.065 0.051 0.047 
Diagnostics     
Pseudo R2 30.2 %  30.7 % 
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 229.6***  683.6*** 
Wald test: effect of top 3 rival equal pre and post-deregulation (χ2) 3.6*  1.2 
LR test: random effects = 0 (χ2) 1.0  97.9*** 
No. of transactions 126  570 
No. of observations (# transactions · # competing banks) 5,655  25,790 
     
Table 6. Lead Manager Choice Following Rival Client Switches 
The models shown here are identical to the specifications shown in Table 5, except that we 1) include all non-shelf deals (not just those in deregulating industries) and 2) 
split the effect of rival relationships into those that are “active” as of the time of the deal in question and those that are “inactive”. We consider three definitions of active 
and inactive. The first (labeled “mergers”) considers a candidate bank’s rival client to be inactive if it has been acquired by another firm during the previous five years 
(based on CRSP delisting codes 200 and 300). The second and third (labeled “switches”) consider a candidate bank’s rival client to be inactive if the firm has awarded 
no underwriting business to the bank for five or three years, respectively. We assume the bank’s information about the rival client to decay following a switch, and so 
code the bank as having an inactive rival client for only one year following the switch (i.e., years 6 and 4, respectively). Beyond that, the bank is coded as no longer 
having a rival client (active or inactive). Choosing a bank that has an active rival client runs the risk of information leakage to one of the issuer’s product-market 
competitors, though there are two potential offsetting benefits in the form of the bank having greater industry expertise or disclosing information about the rival client to 
the issuer. Choosing a bank that has an inactive rival client runs no corresponding risk but still offers both potential benefits. Therefore, the difference between the 
coefficients estimated for active and inactive rival clients isolates the effect of concerns about information leakage on underwriter choice. The models are estimated 
using probit with lead manager-specific random effects and year and industry fixed effects. Results are robust to alternative assumptions about the distribution of the 
error term. The unit of observation is a bank-deal pair. The estimation dataset consists of 5,272 equity deals and 6,744 debt deals completed by firms ranked among the 
ten largest in their four-digit SIC industries (based on Compustat net sales) between 1975 and 2003, for each of which the 50 largest banks are deemed to compete to 
become lead manager (except where fewer than 50 banks were active in the market at the time). This gives a sample of 262,580 bank-deal pairs for equity and 325,780 
for debt. To conserve space, we report only the coefficients estimated for active and inactive rival relationships, and the difference between the two (as a measure of the 
net effect of concerns about information disclosure). Standard errors are shown in italics. The standard errors for the difference between each pair of coefficients are 
calculated using the delta method. We also report marginal effects (denoted dF/dx; the units are percentage points). For comparison, the unconditional likelihood of a 
bank becoming lead manager is about 2.2%. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 Equity Transactions  Debt Transactions 
 Mergers  Switches (T=5)  Switches (T=3)  Mergers  Switches (T=5)  Switches (T=3) 
 
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx 
                  
= 1 if bank has active top 3 rival  -0.129*** -0.3%  -0.117*** -0.3%  -0.080** -0.2%  -0.205*** -0.4%  -0.202*** -0.4%  -0.129*** -0.3% 
 0.034   0.034   0.038   0.021   0.021   0.021  
= 1 if bank has inactive top 3 rival 0.172 0.6%  0.251*** 0.9%  0.240*** 0.9%  -0.135 -0.3%  0.584*** 2.8%  0.401*** 1.6% 
 0.152   0.093   0.072   0.143   0.101   0.066  
Difference ( γα ˆˆ − ) -0.301** -0.9%  -0.368*** -1.2%  -0.321*** -1.1%  -0.070 -0.1%  -0.786*** -3.2%  -0.530*** -1.8% 
 0.155   0.099   0.079   0.144   0.103   0.068  
                  
= 1 if bank has active top 4-10 rival  0.155*** 0.5%  0.151*** 0.5%  0.143*** 0.5%  0.081*** 0.2%  0.090*** 0.2%  0.082*** 0.2% 
 0.026   0.026   0.030   0.019   0.019   0.021  
= 1 if bank has inactive top 4-10 rival 0.154 0.5%  0.357*** 1.5%  0.378*** 1.6%  0.103 0.3%  0.206* 0.6%  0.446*** 1.8% 
 0.105   0.076   0.057   0.118   0.110   0.060  
Difference ( γα ˆˆ − ) 0.001 0.0%  -0.206** -1.0%  -0.235*** -1.1%  -0.021 -0.1%  -0.117 -0.4%  -0.364*** -1.6% 
 0.109   0.081   0.065   0.119   0.111   0.064  
                  
Table 7. Determinants of Underwriter Fees 
In this table, we explore the conjecture that after deregulation, the underwriter’s hold-up power increases, leading to an 
increase in fees. The dependent variable is the fee (or “gross spread”) paid to the underwriter or underwriting syndicate, 
measured as a fraction of gross proceeds the issuer raises, times 100. We estimate ordinary least squares regressions with 
lead manager and year fixed effects. The sample includes either all transactions from four-digit SIC industries subject to 
competition-increasing deregulatory shocks (in columns (1) and (3)) or those deals completed within a ten-year window 
centered on the deregulation event (in columns (2) and (4)). See Table A1 in the Appendix for a definition of these events. 
The main variable of interest is a dummy identifying deals completed after a deregulation event. We control for economies 
of scale in underwriting by including issue proceeds and log issue proceeds and for issuer and offer characteristics. 
Intercepts, lead manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects are not shown. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, 
clustered on lead manager, are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
(two-sided), respectively.  
 
 
Fees in equity deals  
(in %)  
Fees in debt deals 
(in %) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Deregulation events     
=1 if transaction completed post-deregulation  0.914*** 0.519** 0.379*** 0.825*** 
 0.236 0.222 0.107 0.267 
Issue characteristics     
real issue proceeds (in $bn) 0.283** 3.420 0.200 0.088 
 0.127 2.429 0.261 0.289 
ln real issue proceeds (in $m) -0.621*** -0.737*** -0.117*** -0.012 
 0.109 0.209 0.039 0.048 
Issuer and offer characteristics      
ln (1+ real sales in $m) -0.252*** -0.348*** -0.095** -0.133*** 
 0.040 0.078 0.041 0.046 
=1 if private placement 0.787*** 1.214*** 0.185* 0.505*** 
 0.189 0.246 0.100 0.121 
=1 if convertible security   1.023*** 1.533*** 
   0.207 0.435 
Diagnostics     
Adjusted R2 60.2 %  73.2 %  31.2 %  47.9 % 
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (F) 470.8***  240.7***  212.9***  37.3*** 
No. of transactions    529     126  1,719      570 
     
 
Table A1. Deregulation Events 
This table lists deregulation events relevant to the construction of Tables 5 and 7. The main source is Viscusi, Harrington, 
and Vernon (2005). Additional industry-specific details are taken from: http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg18n2f.html, 
http://www.corp.att.com/history/history3.html, http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72899/buck5.htm#P471_99506, 
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Commercial_Aviation/Dereg/Tran8.htm, and 
http://www.Lawdog.com/transport/tp1.htm. We omit deregulation events affecting the financial sector (e.g., the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act 1999), those impacting product mix rather than competition (e.g., the elimination of the Fairness Doctrine 
by the FCC in 1987), and those that were simple asset sales (e.g., the sale of Conrail in 1987). Where the same industry is 
affected by multiple deregulation events, we take as the relevant date for the construction of Tables 5 and 7 the first such 
event, since further deregulation events will likely be anticipated well in advance. Superscript “e” indicates that the industry 
is in the equity sample used in Tables 5 and 7, while superscript “d” indicates inclusion in the debt sample (using in each 




Relevant legislative or executive 
action  Description 
Four-digit SIC codes 
impacted 
1977 Air Cargo Deregulation Act Deregulation of air cargo industry 4512e,d, 4522d 
1978 Airline Deregulation Act First stage of deregulation of Airlines (gradually 
implemented between 1978 and 1982) 
4512, 4522 
 Natural Gas Policy Act Partial deregulation of natural gas prices 1311e,d, 4922e,d, 4925 
1979 Deregulation of satellite earth 
stations 
Deregulation of satellite earth stations 4841d, 4899 
 Urgent-mail exemption (Postal 
Services) 
Allows competition with the US Postal Service on 
urgent mail, charging more that a certain amount  
4513e,d, 4311, 4215, 7389e,d 
1980 Motor Carrier Reform Act Partial Deregulation of Trucking 4213d, 4212, 4142, 4131 
 Household Goods Transportation Act Apply deregulatory measures in Motor Carrier 
Reform Act to household moving services 
4212, 4214 
 Staggers Rail Act Deregulated Railroads 4011d, 4741, 4789, 4013 
 International Air Transportation 
Competition Act 
Second stage of deregulation of Airlines (gradually 
implemented between 1978 and 1982) 
4512, 4522 
 Deregulation of cable television 
(FCC) 
Precursor to 1984 Cable Television Deregulation 
Act 
4841 
 Deregulation of customer premises 
equipment and enhanced services 
(FCC) 
Precursor to 1984 Cable Television Deregulation 
Act 
4841, 4899 
1981 Decontrol of crude oil and refined 
petroleum products (executive order) 
Oil price controls lifted by Reagan 4612, 1311, 1381e,d, 2911e,d, 
2992, 2869, 5171d, 5411e,d, 
2865, 5172d 
 Deregulation of Radio (FCC) Lifts requirement that radio stations have to provide 
news content - lowers costs and facilitates entry and 
diversity of service 
4832 
1982 Bus Regulatory Reform Act Partial Deregulation of bus and trucking industries - 
entry and exit of bus services facilitated and pricing 
controls eased. Trans-border trucking deregulated. 
4111, 4151, 4142 
 AT&T Settlement (Breakup of 
AT&T) 
AT&T has to split, divesting the local exchange 
service providers. An earlier consent decree (1956) 
restricting AT&T's scope of business is lifted. 
4813e,d, 4812e,d, 4899, 
3661e,d, 4822d 
1984 Cable Television Deregulation Act Barred regulation in communities where there was 
"effective competition," which was defined by the 
FCC to be more than three broadcast stations 
4841 
 Shipping Act Deregulated ocean shipping 4412d, 4491 
1986 Trading of Airport Landing Rights Trading of Airport Landing Rights 4581d, 4512, 4522 
1989 Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act 
of 1989 
Removed natural gas price controls 4925, 1311, 4922 




Relevant legislative or executive 
action  Description 
Four-digit SIC codes 
impacted 
1992 Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act 
Regulated cable TV rates 4841 
 Energy Policy Act Opened up wholesale competition by giving FERC 
the authority to order vertically integrated utilities to 
act as a common carrier of electrical power 
4911e,d 
 FERC Order 636 Required pipelines to unbundle the sale and 
transportation of natural gas 
4925, 4922, 4924e,d 
 Negotiated Rates Act Eliminated regulatory distortions related to trucking 
rates 
4213, 4214, 4212 
 Trucking Industry and Regulatory 
Reform Act 
Eliminated remaining interstate and intrastate 
trucking regulation 
4213, 4214, 4212 
1996 Telecommunications Act Deregulated cable TV rates, set conditions for local 
telephone companies to enter long distance markets, 
mandated equal access to local telephone systems 
4841 
 FERC Order 888 Removed impediments to competition in the 
wholesale bulk power market 
4911 
    
 
 
